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T

HE principal purpose of this Article is to discuss in detail the draft
of the proposed convention on the International Recognition of
Rights in Aircraft, which is on the agenda of the Second Assembly of
ICAO for finalization and opening for signature.' This draft was prepared by the ICAO Legal Committee at its first meeting, held in Brussels in September, 1947. In order to discuss the Convention intelligently, however, it will first be necessary to examine the existing law on
the subject so as to understand the objectives which the draft seeks to
achieve, the compromises which it attempts to reach, and the possible
questions of law it leaves unsolved.
A hypothetical case which presents the problems with which we are
concerned is the following: Airline X, incorporated under the laws of
Delaware, desires to purchase a fleet of ten new aircraft, manufactured
in California, in order to conduct its operations from the United States
to England, France, Italy, and beyond. A New York bank is consulted,
and agrees to furnish the necessary funds, provided that it can be given
a valid purchase-money security on each of the new aircraft, together
with a secured interest equal to twenty-five per cent of the total purchase price of the new fleet on its existing fleet of six unencumbered
aircraft as additional security.
The Bank further insists, with respect to the "new" fleet, that every
airplane is to constitute joint security for the entire loan, and that every
airplane in the "old" fleet is to constitute joint security for the additional twentyfive per cent, until the last of the new airplanes is paid
for. Assume, further, that it is decided to employ a mortgage as the
security device in both cases.
If we assume that at the time of the "closing" of the transaction,
1
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none of the "new" fleet has been delivered to the airline, and that two
of the "old" fleet are in France, one in England, one in New York and
two over the high seas between Ireland and the United States bound in
opposite directions, we have a situation which has limitless possibilities
for confusion. First of all, what will be the situation with regard to an
aircraft of the "new"' fleet abroad after it has been turned over to the
airline? Would the lien of the mortgage be valid as against an attaching creditor in England, where chattel mortgages as such are not recognized for domestic purposes? 2 To what extent would it be recognized
in France, where mortgages though permitted,3 can cover only single
units? 4 What would be the subsequent status in the United States of
the aircraft of the "old" fleet which at the time the mortgage was made
were in France, England, and over the high seas?
At the outset, it must be observed that no answer can be given to
these questions with absolute assurance of being correct. There are
still too many theories of conflicts of law which have been applied by
the courts of the world to permit complete certainty of solution.
Basically two problems are presented: the first involves the creation
of the mortgage, the second, relates to its recognition and enforcement. 5
Whether a right of any kind has been created will depend not only on
the terms of the agreement between the parties, but on the provisions
of the law which must be applied to such creation. This is primarily a
matter of determining, under the specific facts of each case, what law is
to be applied and whether the transaction is valid under such law.
The question is distinctly a factual and legal one. The recognition and
enforcement abroad of a right validly created elsewhere, however, is
one which will be resolved primarily as a matter of public policy of the
State in which the determination is to be made., These problems therefore will be treated separately.
LAW GOVERNING CREATION OF INTEREST IN TANGIBLE MOVEABLES

There appear to be at least three rules as to what law governs the
creation or transfer of interests in tangible moveables. Some older
cases have adopted the rule that the domicile of the owner is the jurisdiction whose law should control,0 apparently on the theory of mobilia
sequuntur personam. Mr. Beale in his treatise on the Conflict of Laws
disposes of this doctrine as applied to the creation of rights in chattels
7
as follows:
"If the maxim is thought of with relation to tangibles, to which
it has often been applied, it is almost grotesque. The picture of a
§513 (1945).
S LEMOINE, TRAITE DE DROIT AERIEN, Art. 14, Loi de 1942; Loi du
2 SHAWCROSS AND BEAUMONT, AIR LAW,

5
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1917; §263-270 (1947).
4 Richter, Report submitted to the CITEJA, on Preliminary Draft Convention
relating to aircraftmortgages (Oct. 1931).
S See comment by Moore, Some Principal Aspects of the ICAO Mortgage Convention,
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horse or a library of books following the owner about from place to
place is not one which has legal connotations."
While we can fully agree with Professor Beale as to the grotesque
character of the doctrine, as applied to horses and libraries, whose exact
geographical status at any given time can be determined subsequently,
there is definite appeal to the doctrine insofar as aircraft are concerned.
If it were to be followed, greater certainty would undoubtedly result,
since there Would be no necessity for fixing the geographical location of
300 mile-an-hour aircraft at a precise moment of time. The possibility
of its readoption is therefore not beyond question. Moreover, irrespective of theoretical niceties, few financial institutions will want to lend
large sums of money where there is any substantial chance that the doctrine might be followed so as to apply the law of a jurisdiction under
which the interest it seeks to protect is not recognized. Consequently,
prudence would dictate, in the creation of any secured lien interest,
that the law of the domicile of the airline be checked to determine
whether such interests can lawfully be created.
The second principle of conflicts of laws which is sometimes used by
the courts to determine the law which governs transactions in tangibles
is that the law of the place where the contract is entered into and is to
be performed shall apply. s The Restatement, Conflict of Laws is opposed to this rule, both with respect to the rights of the parties inter se
and with respect to rights of third personsY However, in Jewett v.
Keystone Driller,'0 the Massachusetts court decided that a dispute between the parties to a conditional sale was to be decided in accordance
with the law of the jurisdiction where the contract was made, ignoring
the law of the jurisdiction where the chattel was located. From its
opinion, the court did not stress the fact that the dispute was between
the parties rather than one involving the rights of third parties. However, this distinction was specifically made in Grieme v. Robkes," as follows:
... We think it true that a mortgage executed in one state upon
property in another will not be held in force in the latter state as
against attaching creditors, and others not parties to the mortgage,
without notice, but we believe as between the parties themselves
such mortgage is valid."
By far the great majority of cases appear to apply the rule that the
creation and transfer of a right in a tangible chattel is governed by the
law of the situs of the chattel at the time of the creation or transfer of
the right.12 In this connection, it has been stated that,
It is important to note that the term situs as used in this chapter refers simply to the actual physical location of the property at
8

Kusser v. Sioux City, H. & M. Co., 199 Iowa 200; 200 N. W. 404 (1924);
Holt v. Mahoney, 60 S. D. 158, 244 N. W. 98 (1932) ; Thom"s G. Jewett, Jr., Inc. v.
Keystone Driller Co., 282 Mass. 469, 185 N. E. 369 (1933).
9 RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS, §265 comment (1934).
10 Supra, note 6.
1145 S. D. 480, 188 N. W. 745 (1922).
12 RESTATEMENT,
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the time the transaction whose effect is to be determined occurred.
It is not used, as is sometimes the case, to indicate as a legal conclusion the place whose law is to govern the effect of a particular
transaction which may or may not be the place where the chattel is
at the time." 13
Since the reason for the rule is that it "has the merit of adopting the law
of the jurisdiction which has the actual control of the goods and the
merit of certainty," 14 there is no doubt.that Mr. Goodrich is logically
correct.
We, therefore, are confronted with a rule of conflicts of law, which
6
5
is followed by the majority of American states, by England, France,'
and Germany, 7 and which would require us to pin-point in space
as of the instant the mortgage is signed, 300-mile per hour aircraft
in order to determine by what law the mortgage shall be governed.
It is submitted that such an application of the situs rule is just as
grotesque as the application of the domiciliary rule to Professor Beale's
ambulatory library and that far from having the merit of certainty,
it will give rise to almost insoluble difficulties. Moreover, the doctrine
leaves us completely in the dark with respect to the two aircraft over
the North Atlantic given in the example. Is the mortgage with respect
to such airplanes to be determined, as liens with respect to vessels,' 8
by the law of the flag? If so, we are in a particularly precarious spot,
since there is no national mortgage law as such applicable to aircraft
in the United States, but only the laws of the vapious states - and
which one of those should we apply? Again, would the law of the
flag cease to apply the instant the airplane arrived over the territorial
waters of another nation? Any other solution would appear incompatible with national sovereignty in overlying airspace, so carefully
preserved by the Chicago Convention. 9 Even though 'the law of
the flag would have little utility, it would obviously be impossible to
apply the law of the situs to these two aircraft.
Domestically, the matter is further complicated by two recent deg
cisions of the United States Supreme Court-United States v. Causbysa
and United States v. State of California.l° b The effect of 'these two
decisions may ,well be to place aircraft flying above the minimum altitudes over states of the United States within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the Federal Government.Oc The logical extension of the Causby
case would give aircraft cruising at normal flight altitudes a federal
situs for conflicts purposes.
With these difficulties in mind, it is not easy to conceive of a court
13 GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS, §150, note (2nd ed. 1938).
14 Swayze, J., in Lees v. Harding, Whitman & Co., 68 N. J. Eq. 622, 629

(1905).

15 DICEY, CONFLICT OF LAWS, 608 (5th ed. 1932).
16 LORENZEN, CASES ON CONFLICT OF LAWS, 647 note (4th ed. 1937).

'7

Ibid.

Is The Velox, 21 F. 479 (1884); The Angela Maria, 35 F. 430 (1888).
19 Convention on International Civil Aviation, Art. I. See Cooper, Tke Proposed Multilateral Agreement on Commercial Rights in International Civil Air.
Transport, 14 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE 125, 127 (1947).
19a 328 U. S. 256 (1946).
19b 332 U. S. 19 (1947).
19c See Cooper, cit. note 19 supra.
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pushing the situs rule to its logical conclusion. The Restatement
recognizes the potential difficulty in a far less cogent form, 20 but
refuses to express any opinion as to what law will govern a transaction
whereby several moveables, in different jurisdictions, are transferred
or encumbered by a single act.
Possibly, a court if confronted with this situation would apply
the rule, but would determine that something more lasting than
transitory location be used to determine situs - and would apply

the law of the place where the aircraft was usually based. 21 This, in
effect, would be only a variation of the domiciliary rule, but if the
place of basing and the domicile of the owner were in different jurisdictions, such a rule would have neither the doctrinal comfort of
mobilia sequuntur personam nor the logical justification of lex rei
situs. Another facet to the problem which must be borne in mind
is the fact that the situs rule only becomes inappropriate while the
aircraft is in the air. Certainly, if an aircraft is attached abroad, or is
locally subjected to a lien or other encumbrance in foreign territory,
it is obvious that it should be subject to tile complete dominion of
that jurisdiction. The aircraft loses in such circumstances its exclusive
and different character from other chattels.
From considering the various doctrines of conflicts of law applicable
to transactions covering fleets of aircraft, one is impressed by the
inappropriateness of each of them to meet current commercial needs
in a logical manner. The domicile of the airline- i.e., its state of
incorporation, may never see any of the aircraft its laws are supposed
to affect; the same may be said of the place where the contract is made;
and as for the lex rei situs, this doctrine, wher applied to aircraft
actually in flight, presents untold problems of fact finding.
Fortunately, to be forewarned is to be forearmed, since it is probable that the transaction can be so arranged as to take account of the
varying possibilities. In the case of mortgages covering after-acquired
aircraft, it is necessary to provide in the indenture for the delivery of
each aircraft in a State where after-acquired property clauses are
legal and in accord with the formalities of that state.2 2 It also would
be desirable to have all aircraft in the existing fleet, or' such of them
as are to be subjected to lien, brought into one jurisdiction at the
time the transaction is closed, preferably the state where the contract
is made and to be performed, which, if possible, should be the state
of the airline's incorporation. Although it would not be difficult
to close the usual transaction in the state of incorporation, the problem
of herding all the airline's airplanes into the jurisdiction at that time
might well prove so costly as to be impracticable. However, there is
no reason why the indenture should not be worded to provide that
each aircraft should be bound under the mortgage separately only after
20 RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS, §256 caveat (1934).
21 Cf. Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292 (1943).
22 See BEALE, op. cit. supra, note 5, §265.2; RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT

LAWS, §265b (1934).
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it has returned from flight and has become immobilized in the chosen
jurisdiction.
The importance of taking these varying conflicts theories into
account at the time of the transaction cannot be overemphasized.
The proposed Convention on the International Recognition of Rights
in Aircraft will impose on the various Contracting States obligations
to recognize rights in aircraft "which have been created in conformity
with the law of the country whose nationality the aircraft possesses."
Cases will undoubtedly arise in the future where a foreign court
will be confronted with the problem of enforcing, as against the
citizens of that country, a mortgage held by an American citizen on
an American aircraft. In such cases, the court may be quick to seize
on the conflicting rules in our several states, and any doubt that a
lien has been validly created on the aircraft may be expected to be
pressed to the utmost by attorneys representing local creditors.
RECOGNITION OF RIGHTS VALIDLY CREATED

Assuming that the problem presented by the foregoing discussion
has been successfully resolved, and a lien created on an aircraft which
will be recognized as valid under each of the doctrines of conflicts of
laws discussed, there remains the much more serious problem as to the
extent to which such a lien will be recognized and enforced in
other countries. At the present time, in the absence of an international treaty on the subject, this is almost impossible to predict.
Generally speaking, the rule most usually applied appears to be that
a foreign right in a foreign chattel will be recognized and enforced
only to the extent that such a right is not contrary to the public policy
of the forum.
The foregoing statement of the rule, however, does not in fact
offer a very sound basis for prediction if the varying laws of the states
of the United States are to be taken as a guide. In many of the
states security interests in chattels brought in from other states must be
recorded in the second state.23 In Pennsylvania, and for a long time
in Louisiana, chattel mortgages were not recognized, and valid mortgages created on chattels in other jurisdictions were not enforced
when the chattel was brought into those states. 24 Although the
validity of a chattel mortgage in a second state should not, in theory
at least, depend on whether the mortgagee has consented to the removal of the chattel, the rule in at least six states appears to be that
if the removal is with the consent of the mortgagee, refiling in the
25
new state is necessary.
Moreover, it is almost universally true that a prior lien may be
placed on a chattel in a foreign state which could have the effect of
making the mortgage valueless. 26 Restrictions which diminish the
23 See note, 57 A. L. R. 702, et seq. (1928).
24 BEALE, op. cit. supra, note 5, §266.3.
25 See note, 57 A. L. R. 695, 714 (1928), and cases there cited.
26 RESTATEMENT,

CONFLICT OF LAWS,

§268(d)

(1934).
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effectiveness of rights created in foreign jurisdictions may be either
judge-made or statute-made, but in any event the secured creditor
may find the value of the security diminished by reason of the removal
of the chattel from the state where the lien was made.
With the possibility of many different and unpredictable treatments of secured interests in aircraft by foreign countries, it is obvious
that an international convention which will bring certainty to the
field is indispensable before credit arrangements can receive widespread adoption in international air transportation. To be of any
practical use, such a convention must accord recognition and substantial protection to validly created rights in foreign aircraft. It
must include an undertaking on the part of each country to limit
the amount of local prior liens which it will permit to be placed
ahead of a pre-existing mortgage on a foreign aircraft. Because such
recognition and protection must be uniform throughout all Contracting States, the differing national philosophies as to the relative
status of the secured creditor with respect to the general creditors
must be carefully weighed and a solution found which will be satisfactory to all.
HISTORICAL

DEVELOPMENTS

OF

THE

DRAFT

CONVENTION

From the beginning of international air transport activities, men
connected with aviation have realized the problems involved in connection with rights in aircraft which fly abroad. In 1926 CITEJA
was created as a result of the International Conference on Air Law
held in Paris in the Autumn of 1925 and was specifically charged by
that Conference with drawing up draft conventions on aeronautical
registers, aircraft ownership, rights in rem, and mortgages. In 1931
the OITEJA produced two draft conventions, one relating to an
aeronautical property record and the other to mortgages and other
secured interests. These draft conventions are what might be called
the grandparents of the present Brussels draft. In the early CITEJA
draft on the Aircraft Property Record, the draftsmen attempted to
establish what might be termed the "Torrens" system of the air.
This system, however, was confined to proprietary interests in aircraft.
Possibly for the reason that certain states might be unwilling to accept
mortgages on airplanes,'27 the draft convention relating to the recognition and protection of such rights was embodied in a separate
document.
Apparently, the time was not ripe in international flying for either
of these conventions to have widespread, enthusiastic support. 2 Both
of them lay dormant until the Chicago Conference in 1944, at which
time, and at the suggestion of the American delegation, a resolution
27 See note 3, supra.
28 The English delegate to CITEJA, Sir Alfred Dennis, stated that the British Delegation was not interested in the mortgage convention and abstained from
voting thereon-Compte Rendu, 6th Sess., 50, 134.
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was adopted. recommending that the various governments represented at the conference give consideration to the early calling of an
international conference on private international air law for the purpose of adopting a convention dealing with the transfer of title to
aircraft, and that such private air law conference include in the bases
of discussions, the existing draft conventions relating to mortgages,
other real securities and the aerial privileges.
Pursuant to this resolution, the matter was considered by the
CITEJA in Paris in January of 1946. It was again considered by
the Interim Assembly of the PICAO, held in Montreal in May, 1946.
The results of the discussion at this latter meeting produced a unified
draft combining the principles of both the early CITEJA drafts.
Several questions of substance were left unresolved at that time, however, and the various Contracting States were therefore asked for their
views as to the proper solution. The same questions were also considered by the CITEJA in its Cairo meeting held in November, 1946.
Real progress toward achieving unanimity was reached in a
meeting of an Ad Hoc Committee held in Paris in February of 1947
to consider the replies from the several countries to the PICAO
questionaire and to work on a new draft convention. Represented
at this meeting were delegates of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Belgium. This draft was circulated by the ICAO
to all member States and formed the basis for consideration by the
Fourth Commission of the First Assembly of ICAO in May, 1947. 3o
The meetings of the Fourth Commission of the First Assembly
of ICAO were somewhat handicapped in the discussion of the Convention by the necessity for dealing with more immediate problems
confronting the Assembly. Because of the limited time available, a
searching analysis of the real problem was not made, and a great
deal of energy was spent in considering the different types of security
interests, particularly the American "equipment trust". It is submitted that the mechanics whereby a secured interest is created have
relatively little bearing on the fundamental problem - ie: to what
extent will the countries allow such interests in foreign aircraft to be
protected. Nevertheless, the Montreal drafting committee recommended a provision which would have permitted Contracting States
to "reserve out" on the undertaking to recognize certain elements
of the equipment trust.31
Despite the numerous considerations and reconsiderations, all
questions of substance were by no means settled in Montreal and the
question was fully reconsidered, debated and argued at length at
the Brussels Meeting of the Legal Committee of ICAO in September
29 Final Act International Civil Aviation Conference, Chicago, 1944, Part V.
30 See 14 JouRNAL OF Am LAW AND COMMERCE 382 (1947).
31 Report of Drafting Committee, ICAO Doc. 4362.
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of 1947.32 It is difficult to state with any degree of accuracy which
hurdle was the most difficult to overcome. Broadly stated, the jurists
of the respective countries were distrustful, to say the least, of the
various security devices and interests which other countries offered
their own investors. That agreement was finally reached on a draft that
should be acceptable to most nations is a tribute to the patience and
ingenuity of the men attending that meeting.
LIMITATIONS ON SCOPE OF CONVENTION

Perhaps it would be wise to say a few words about what the Convention does not purport to cover before going into a detailed discussion of its various provisions. In the first place, the Convention
does not purport to state by what law the creation of interests in
aircraft or their transfer will be governed. No attempt is made to
resolve the difficulty in choosing between the conflicting doctrines
set forth in the first part of this article. The absence of such coverage,
however, is not clearly seen from a reading of the draft. In Article I,
after the recitation of rights which the States undertake to recognize,
there is a proviso which reads, "provided that such rights have been
constituted and are recorded in a public record, in conformity with
the law of the Contracting State whose nationality the aircraft possesses." It will be noted that the phrase "in conformity with the
law" does not specify the municipal law of such Contracting State
but merely requires the rights to have been constituted in conformity
with the law of such state. The discussions at Brussels make it amply
clear that what is intended is the entire law of a Contracting State,
including its law on conflict of laws.33
Consequently, it will be necessary for a court which is seized with
a problem in the future to consider under what law a given transaction
was consummated, applying to its decision the law of conflict of laws
of the Contracting State whose nationality the aircraft bears.
Secondly, the proposed Convention does not purport to protect
international credit as such in all aircraft, but is limited to protecting
credit in aircraft while abroad. The proposal was made several imes
during consideration of the Convention, both at Montreal and at
Brussels, that the, interests of foreign creditors in domestic aircraft
be extended the same protection as that extended to creditors' interests in foreign aircraft. This proposal was finally withdrawn when it
4
became apparent to its proponent that it would be rejected
The third thing that the proposed Convention does not purport
to do is to establish a "treaty mortgage". The Contracting States
are left almost completely free to utilize whatever form of security
32
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device may appeal to them. The scope of the Convention is limited
to the recognition, enforcement, and protection of valid secured
interests in foreign aircraft.
The fourth field which the proposed Convention does not purport to cover are interests created not by agreement of the parties
but through operation of law. It was decided at the Brussels Meeting
that any attempt to safeguard judicially created interests would be
unwise and unnecessary and that the same result could be obtained
through a recording of a transfer required to be made by domestic law.
A fifth realm in which the Brussels Legal Committee did not
desire to venture was a mandatory requirement on Contracting States
to maintain a record or system for recording. Under the earlier drafts,
mandatory provisions had been made for the maintenance of a recording system uniform in all Contracting States. It was considered by
the representatives attending the Brussels Meeting that the proposal
was not in keeping with the present philosophy of the Convention
and that it was not desirable to enter into the realm of the internal
affairs of the various Contracting States to such an extent.. Consequently, the Convention is now phrased as to permit a State to maintain a recording system. If such a system is maintained and rights
are recorded of record, they will be recognized and enforced in foreign
countries. But there is no requirement that such a register or record
be maintained.
A sixth and extremely important phase of international judicial
relations which the Convention does not cover relates to execution
proceedings and the necessity for filing notice of such proceedings
in the record of the Contracting State whose nationality the aircraft
bears. Preceding drafts all included a provision as to the recording
of foreign executions on aircraft and made provisions that a purchaser
from the owner, buying the aircraft after the recording of the attachment or execution, would not prevail as against the executing creditor
or the vendee at the judicial sale. This provision was omitted by a
no means unanimous vote of the Committee, but it is considered that
its omission is not vital.
The point was made at Brussels that a foreign judicial sale could be
defeated by the fraudulent transfer of the aircraft by the owner to
some innocent third party, who records. The purchaser not having
actual or constructive notice of the attachment would be entitled to
prevail as against the attaching creditor by the municipal law of most
countries.

Therefore

-

so the argument goes

-

the foreign court

would have to recognize the paramount title of the new owner and
dismiss the attachment against the aircraft by reason of the undertaking in Article I of the Convention. However, it is believed that
this argument ignores the primary doctrine of conflicts of law discussed
earlier in this article-i.e.: that the creation or transfer of an interest
in a moveable is governed by the law of the place where the chattel
is when the transaction takes place. The chattel presumably remains
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in the foreign jurisdiction in the custody of the court.

Consequently, when the court looks to the state of registry to
determine whether the fraudulent transfer is valid by the law of the
flag, it will consider that country's law on conflicts of law, which,
in most cases, would apply the law of the place where the chattel
was at the time of purported transfer. Thus, by a somewhat roundabout way the court of the forum would end up by applying its own
law. This would undoubtedly be true even where the state of registry
has no national law on conflict of law, as is the case of the United
States. 35 It is scarcely conceivable that a court holding a chattel
in its custody would permit a fraud to be perpetrated on it by reason
of diverse rulings of subjurisdictions of the country where the aircraft
is registered.
DISCUSSION OF THE CONVENTION,

Article I

-

ARTICLE BY ARTICLE

Rights Recognized by Contracting States

Article 136 contains the basic undertakings in the Convention.
In it each Contracting State undertakes to recognize four classes of
rights. These classes of rights are so described as to break down
into their various constituent elements every known interest regarded
as a recordable interest in American law. When finally so broken
down the bugaboo of the equipment trust which confronted the
foreign lawyers soon vanished. It will be noted that the undertaking
of each State is to recognize the rights set forth. Paragraph (1) of
the Article contains no undertaking to enforce such rights. At first
glance, this might appear to be an oversight, but it is submitted that
the present text is more desirable the way it is than it would be if it
included a specific undertaking to enforce such rights.
Under paragraph (2) of the Article the effect of the recording of
such rights with regard to third parties is to be determined according
to the law of the Contracting State where they are recorded. Consequently, there is a definite undertaking to enforce the rights as
against third parties, if the domestic law of the aircraft called for
such enforcement. On the other hand, there is no undertaking to
enforce the rights as between the parties to an agreement, and conse35 Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941), holding that Erie v. Tomp
kins [304 U.S. 64 (1937)] requires federal courts to follow state rules of conflicts
of law.
38 Article I-Each Contracting State undertakes to recognize
a) rights of property in aircraft,
b) rights to acquire aircraft by purchase coupled with possession of the
aircraft,
c) rights to possession of aircraft under leases of six months or more,
d) mortgages, hypotheques, and similar rights in aircraft which are contractually created as security for the payment of an indebtedness,
provided that such rights have been constituted and are recorded in a public record, in conformity with the law of the Contracting State whose nationaity the
aircraft possesses.
(2) Except as otherwise provided in this Convention, the effects of the
recording of such rights with regard to third parties shall be determined according to the law of the Contracting State where they are recorded.
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quently the vexacious question of whether specific performance or
money damages is to be decreed is avoided.
The list of rights which are to be protected are self-explanatory
and needs no discussion here. The reason that rights to possession
under leases of six months or more were included [subparagraph (c)I
was to protect the interest of an airline to retain possession of the aircraft during the term of its lease under an equipment trust indenture.
Subparagraph (d), of course, relates to the airline's option to acquire
the title to the aircraft upon performance of all conditions.
The voluntary nature of the keeping of the record has already
been discussed as has the phrase "in conformity with the law" of the
Contracting State. However, it is believed desirable to reiterate at
this point that the words "in conformity with the law" relate not only
to the municipal law of the Contracting State in question but to its
law on conflicts of law. Consequently, it would be perfectly possible
to. have a transfer of an aircraft, made while the aircraft is outside
the jurisdiction of its state of registry, effected in accordance with
the law of the foreign state. And if the State in which the aircraft
is located at the time of the attempted creation of the interest does
not recognize such interests, then apparently no valid right will have
been created under the Convention, even though the home State does
recognize such right in its own municipal law. On the other hand,
it would appear that if a right is created in an aircraft in a foreign
jurisdiction of a type not recognized by the jurisdiction of the aircraft's registration, a valid right will nevertheless be created if the
right is permitted to be recorded in the latter Contracting State.
Thus, an aircraft which is to be sold to a citizen of a foreign country
could be mortgaged or otherwise encumbered in the country of its
manufacture, even though it is initially registered in a foreign jurisdiction, provided that the foreign country (a) is a. party to the
Convention, (b) maintains a record, (c) permits' the encumbrance to
be recorded, and (d) follows the lex rei situs doctrine of conflicts of
-law. This point is presented more as a matter of intellectual interest
than as a matter of practical concern, for it is not believed that many
financial institutions would want to rely upon a lien obtained through
such devious channels.
Paragraph (2) of Article I lays down the mandatory rule that the
-effect of recording of any of the enumerated rights with regard to
third parties shall be determined according to the law of the Contracting State where they are recorded. Nothing is said, however, as
to the effect of recording or lack thereof as between the parties.
Omission of such provision was made advisedly. Primarily, this
omission was due to the fact that there is no widespread necessity
for the protection of such rights and their enforcement between the
patties internationally. Secondly, since there is no mandatory provision to record in the Convention, and since in many states, including
the United States, an unrecorded transfer or right is valid as between
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the parties, an undertaking to recognize recorded rights as between
the parties, would leave in doubt what treatment should be accorded
to unrecorded rights, as between the parties. In view of the fact
that making the Convention applicable as between the parties to a
given transaction might have far-reaching and unforeseen effects, it
was decided that limiting the Convention to third parties was the
far sounder approach.
Article II-Recording and Record Procedures
The provisions of this Article37 are self-explanatory. Paragraph (4)
of the Article was designed to cover cases such as the recording system
in the United States where a document is deemed recorded when
it is received for filing. This procedure departs from the practices in
other -countries where record books are maintained and separate
pages for each aircraft are contained in the book. Paragraph (5)
of the Article originally related only to reasonable fees for recording.
However, it was deemed desirable to expand this to cover all types
of services performed by the authority maintaining the records.
Article III - Privileged Claims

Article II18 represents one of the places in which the most delicate
balancing of interests was necessary in order to arrive at a satisfactory
compromise. Certain delegations, such as that of the United States,
37 Article 1I-(1) All recordings relating to a given aircraft must appear in
the record of the State whose nationality the aircraft possesses.
(2) The address of the authority responsible for maintaining the record must
be shown on the certificate of registration as to nationality.
(8) Any person shall be entitled to receive from the authority maintaining
the record duly certified copies or extracts of the particulars recorded. Such
copies or extract shall constitute prima facie evidence of the contents of the record.
(4) The national law may provide that the filing of any document for recording shall have the same effect as a recording. In that case, adequate provision
shall be made to ensure that such documents are open to the public.
(5) Reasonable charges may be made for services performed by the authority

maintaining the record.

8Article III-(1) The claims set forth below give rise to charges which,
without recording, follow the aircraft and take priority over all other claims:
a) compensation due for salvage of the aircraft,
b) extraordinary expenses indispensable for the preservation of the aircraft.
(2) The claims enumerated in paragraph (1) above shall be satisfied in the
inverse order of the dates of the incidents in connection with which they are
incurred.
(8) The priority accorded to these claims by paragraph (1) above shall be
extinguished unless judicial action thereon is commenced within three months
from the date of their arising. The law of the forum shall determine the contingencies upon which this period may be interruped [sic] or suspended.
(4) If a charge arising from any such claim has been recorded, it shall, on
the extinction of the priority accorded by paragraph (1), take priority as a right
mentioned in Article I.
(5) Any of the claims mentioned in this Article may be entered at any time
on the record so as to give notice thereof to all concerned.
(6) In the case of any incident occurred within the territory of a Contracting
State to an aircraft there registered the question whether any of the claims mentioned in paragraph (1) is entitled to the priority or charge there mentioned shall
be determined by the national law.
C7) Except as provided in this Article, no charge taking priority over the
rights mentioned in Article I shall be admitted or recognized by Contracting
States.
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desired to hold the so-called preferred or priority claims to an absolute
minimum. Other countries desired to afford priority status to claims
for airport and navigation fees, claims for damages to airport structures, and a host of other claims which they believed should take
39
priority over any secured interest.
As a matter of principle, it was finally resolved that only such
charges as would inure to the benefit of the mortgage or secured
interest holder as well as to the owner of the aircraft should be
allowed. Consequently, priority claims have been limited as set
forth in paragraph (1) of this Article to compensation due for salvage
of the aircraft and to extraordinary expenses indispensable for the
preservation of the aircraft. This second category of claims is possibly
not as free from ambiguity as it might be. What kind of expenses
represent extraordinary expenses? Despite this ambiguity it was decided at Brussels that there was ample safeguard in the word "indispensable." If the expenses themselves were not indispensable for
the preservation of the aircraft, the expenses must be disallowed.
Consequently, it is very doubtful that large expenses will be incurred
with respect to a particular aircraft. The Maritime rule was adopted
that priority charges shall be satisfied in the inverse order of the
dates of the instances in connection with which the claims were
incurred.
The priorities are also very short-lived. Such priority is lost
unless judicial action on the claims has been commenced within three
months from the date of their arising. However, this three-month
period may, according to the law of the forum, be either "interrupted"
or "suspended" upon the happening of certain contingencies.
The use of the words "interrupted or suspended" in Article III,
paragraph (3) gave rise to an interesting and rather extended debate
as to their meaning. The results of the debate indicate that when
the three-month period is "interrupted" upon the happening of a
contingency, it will start in again in toto when the contingency ceases
and the claimant will have a full 90 days in which to commence his
action. The word "suspended," on the other hand, means that only
90 days in all are available to the claimant whether they run consecutively or are separated by one or more contingencies. 40
Paragraph (4) of Article III is a highly novel provision permitting the recording of a priority claim as a right recognizable under
Article I. Consequently, if any one of the priority charges is recorded
by the holder thereof, either before the 90-day period has expired or
subsequently thereto, it will be treated as though it were a right
specifically mentioned in Article I. Such a right under the United
States' system of recording would take effect as of the date of recordation if subsequent to the expiration of the 90-day period, and if prior
s9 Comments received from the Government of India (re 1947 Montreal
draft) ICAO Doc. 4548.
40 Minutes, Brussels meeting, LC Working Draft 20, pp. 7 & 8.
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to such expiration, at the end of the period.
Paragraph (5) of Article III is designed not only to implement
paragraph (4) but also to direct the State to permit the recording
of these rights at any time. The advantages of this are said 'to be
that subsequent purchasers of aircraft may be given notice of priority
claims by looking at the record. It should be noted, however, that
this provision would have no effect in a country where no recording
system is maintained.
Paragraph (6) of Article III is part of the solution to one of the
knottiest problems presented by the Convention. That problem
deals with the proper sphere of its applicability. In general, this
subject is treated in Article IX of the Convention. However, that
Article makes the Convention applicable "to aircraft registered as to
nationality in a Contracting State, provided that a Contracting State
shall not be obliged to apply [the] Convention (except Articles III
and VII) within its own territory to aircraft there registered." The
requirement in Article IX, as to the application of Article III to
domestic aircraft, was designed to assure that salvors and those performing "indispensable" services for an aircraft while on foreign
soil would not be deprived of their priority upon the return of the
aircraft to domestic territory. To accomplish this end, it was neces,sary to make the provisions of Article III applicable so far as they
relate to priority claims arising outside domestic territory, even after
the aircraft has returned home. An unfettered application of Article
III to domestic aircraft, however, would require each Contracting
State to make the priority claims applicable to its own aircraft arising on domestic soil. It was fully recognized by all the lawyers
gathered at the Brussels conference that it was highly undesirable
to force States to adopt rules relating to their own aircraft while on
their own territory. That is a matter primarily for domestic concern
and is not properly the subject for an international convention. Thus,
there was inserted in Article III a saving clause which permits the
Contracting State to make inapplicable the priority provisions of
Article III to domestic aircraft on domestic territory. However, it is
not necessary that this be done, and if the Contracting State desires
that such types of claims be granted priority it may-do so under

this rule.
Paragraph (7) of Article III is one of the most important key-,
stones of the Convention.

By this paragraph Contracting States are

prohibited, from admitting or recognizing any charge taking priority
over the rights mentioned in Article I. Consequently, no tax claim
of a foreign State can be placed ahead of a mortgage on a visiting
aircraft going into that State. Nor will the claims of provisioners,
suppliers, or other lienors be admitted. The effect of this provision,
therefore, is to guarantee the rank of security in accordance with

the priority given it under domestic law of the aircraft's registry.
The placement of paragraph (7) lhowever, is unfortunate. Until
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the last day of the Brussels conference this provision was contained
in Article IV,.which at that time was entirely different from the present
Article IV. In order to reduce the number of Articles, as well as to
eliminate a troublesome cross-reference, the suggestion was made that
this provision be moved up into Article III. This was agreed to
unanimously and without discussion by the delegates. However,it was not recognized at the time what hidden effect such a change
in placement would have. By putting the provision in Article III, it
becomes mandatory on all States to apply it to domestic aircraft
while on domestic territory. This would have the unfortunate effect
of preventing a State from imposing tax liens on a domestic aircraft
ahead of preexisting mortgages. The majority, if not most of the
States concerned, would be violently opposed to such a restriction,
and it would probably be violative, of constitutional provisions of
several Latin American countries. Therefore, the United States has
recommended in its comments to ICAO on the Convention that the
provision be moved from Article Ifi and included as a paragraph
(3) of Article 1. This change accomplished, foreign Contracting
States will bc prohibited from placing their own liens ahead of
mortgages on visiting aircraft, while the home State of such aircraft
may place such liens and charges ahead of domestic mortgages.
Of course, such tax claims would not be enforced abroad, since -they
do not belong to the rights enumerated in Article I.
Article IV-

Interest and Ancillary Charges

4

Article IV ' is self-explanatory and need not be discussed at length
here. The legislative history of the Convention makes it clear that
attorneys fees and other ancillary charges which are reserved in a
42
trust indenture may be covered by the lien of the charge or mortgage.
Article V-Judicial Sales
41

This Article , presents possibly the most interesting compromises
41 Article IV-The priority of a right mentioned in Article 1, paragraph (1)d,
extends to the sums thereby secured. However, the amount of interest included
shall not exceed that accrued during three years prior to the execution proceedings
together with that accrued during the execution proceedings.
42 Report and Commentary, ICAO Doe. 4634, page 7.
43 Article V-(1) The proceedings of a sale in execution shall be determined
by the law of the Contracting State where the sale takes place.
(2) The following provisions shall however be observed:
a) the date and place of the sale shall be fixed at least six weeks in advance,
b) the executing creditor shall supply a duly certified extract of the
recordings concerning the aircraft, shall give public notice of the sale
at the place where the aircraft is registered at least one month before
the day fixed, and shall concurrently notify, by registered letter, the
recorded owner and the holders of rights in the aircraft recorded or
entered on the record whose addresses are known.
(3) The consequences of failure to observe the requirements of paragraph
(2) shall be as provided by the law of the Contracting State where the sale takes
place.
(4) No sale can be effected unless all charges having priority over the claim
of the executing creditor in accordance with this Convention, which are established before the competent authority, are covered by the proceeds of the sale or
assumed by the purchaser.
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reached in the Brussels meetings. The first three paragraphs are
fairly self-explanatory, and it is not necessary to discuss them in detail.
It should be noted, however, in passing that the provision for judicial
sales follows out the general rule of conflicts of law that the procedure
to be followed on execution sales is that of the forum and not of the
place where the aircraft was encumbered or the domicile of the
owner. 44 It should also be noted that the first three paragraphs
have been drawn so as to place no responsibility of notifying the
interested parties on the authority responsible for maintaining the
record in which the rights are recorded.
Paragraph (4) of Article V relates to the establishment of a
minimum bid when the aircraft is to be sold at judicial sale. In effect,
it provides that no aircraft may be sold under such circumstances
unless the proceeds of the sale are equal to or better than the total
amount of prior secured liens. In the case of mortgages or other
security interests where several aircraft form the security, as under
the fleet mortgage doctrine, the minimum bid required would be
the total debt outstanding. This, of course, could well exceed the
actual value of the aircraft on sale, and except in the event of some
abnormal circumstances would prevent it.
This provision is in effect a practical compromise of the doctrine
of "la purge." Under continental law, uponsale of a secured chattel,
a clear title will be vested in the purchaser at the sale, free and clear of
all preexisting liens. This doctrine was strongly opposed by financing
institutions because of the possibility that a lien held by them would
be wiped out upon a foreign judicial sale and the proceeds would not
be sufficient to pay the outstanding debt. The American position in
this regard was in conformity with the desires of the financial interests, and at Brussels it was advocated that no prior lien should be
purged at a judicial sale, but should carry over and remain as a
prior secured interest ahead of that of the purchaser at the sale.
In assessing the results of this compromise against the background
of the continental position on the one hand and the American position on the other, it is believed that substantial satisfaction is given
to both doctrines. In theory, the judicial sale has the effect of trans(5)

The national law of a Contracting State may provide that the rights

referred to in Article I, if held as security for an indebtedness, shall not be set up,
to an extent greater than 80%, of the sale price of the aircraft taken in execution,
as against persons who have sustained injury or damage on the surface caused by
.such aircraft, or by any other aircraft encumbered with similar rights held by the
same persons, except in the case where the injury or damage in question is adequately and effectively insured by a State or with an insurance undertaking in
any State. In the absence of other limit established by the law of the Contracting
State where the execution sale takes place, insurance in the equivalent to the
amount of the purchase price when new of the aircraft sold on execution shall be

considered adequate for the damages caused.
(6) Costs legally chargeable under the law of the Contracting State where
the sale takes place which are incurred in the common interest of creditors in the
course of execution proceedings leading to sale, shall be paid out of the proceeds
of sale, before any claims, including those given preference by Article III.
44 RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS, §585 (1934).
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ferring the entire property in the aircraft to the new purchaser. In
practice, however, such a sale cannot be held unless all charges and
prior encumbrances have been covered. The sale, when it can be
held, wipes out all prior charges and transfers the claim of such
secured creditors to the purchase money. On the other hand, the
secured creditor is given reasonable protection against "strike suits."
This provision seems to have received the support of all governments who have commented on the Brussels draft to date- at least,
tacit support - since it has not been mentioned in any of the government comments.
Perhaps the most interesting and novel provision in the Convention appears in paragraph (5) of Article V. In many ways it
represents the heart of the Convention insofar as financing large
fleets of aircraft is concerned. To the proponents of "security of
possessions" a lien covering several aircraft jointly would naturally
encumber each airplane with the total amount of outstanding
indebtedness, provided, of course, that more than 100 per cent repayment of the claim could not be had. Thus, so long as a substantial
portion of the debt remains outstanding and exceeds the value of all
airplanes of the fleet individually, each such airplane would be
almost immune from individual attachment, seizure, and sale. On
the other hand, to the proponents of the theory of security of transactions, the fleet mortgage principle was undesirable because it
effectively prevented the sale or attachment of an aircraft which
was encumbered with a fleet mortgage.
At the Brussels meeting much consideration was given this point.
It was brought out that a state into which a foreign aircraft is operated
has a very definite interest in the protection of its citizens from the
negligence of the airline operator.. This protection would be obtained
in part at least by insuring that all assets of the airline would be
effectively subject to attachment and execution at the suit of such
an injured citizen, and it was felt highly undesirable to limit in any
way his right of action against the airline and the airline's airplanes.
Prior liens, surpassing the value of any aircraft of the fleet, in the
hands of third parties, would deprive the injured citizen of any means
of reaching the most substantial item of property belonging to the
airline. This was deemed distinctly contrary to the public interest
by many of the delegates present.
With respect to contract and other "voluntary" creditors, no strong
equities were present. Whereas there is great justice in providing
some measure'of protection for those who are injured through the
negligent operation of a foreign airplane, there seems to be no equitable reason why tradesmen and other people relying on the general
credit of the airline should be given protection to the extent of injuring the security value of the financial institution which made the
operation possible. In the case of the ordinary commercial dealer,
he has ample opportinity to check the credit standing of the airline

JOURNAL

OF AIR

LAW

AND

COMMERCE

with whom he deals, and it is not necessary for him to rely, nor does
he in fact rely, on the aircraft flown by the company for security.
Paragraph (5) of Article V, therefore, provides, in effect, that
the "fleet mortgage" doctrine shall not be valid beyond 80 per cent
of the value of the airplane 'attached as against a person who has
been injured by such aircraft or by another aircraft in the fleet, unless
adequate and effective third party insurance is carried by the airline
equivalent to the amount of the purchase price of the aircraft when
new. In such cases, of course, the injured party would have available
to satisfy his claim an insurance fund much larger than the 20 per
cent equity in the airplane. No such provision has been made for
the ordinary commercial general creditor, since he will have the
opportunity to check the credit standing of the airline before doing
business with them on a credit basis.
The provision has been so drawn as to apply only where a fleet
mortgage or at least a "fleet" relationship exists between the security
holder and the owner of the aircraft. In this way, a prospective
secured creditor need only concern himself with the fleet on which
he gives credit, and need not worry as to whether there is insurance
coverage on other aircraft belonging to his borrower. In the comments which have been received to date from the yarious governments, only Sweden has seen fit to express an opinion, which was
45
favorable.
The remaining provision in Article V - paragraph (6) - relates
to court costs and makes them a first item chargeable against the
proceeds of the sale on execution.
Article VI - Purge of Prior Claims on Judicial Sale
Turning to Article VI'" of the Convention> it will be noted that
the doctrine of the "purge" has been retained. This is merely part
of the compromise discussed above under Article V (4) and represents the view favored by the continental lawyers. Moreover, it is
not entirely unknown in American law, since the bankruptcy court
4
may order the sale of a bankrupt's assets free and clear of prior liens. T
In one respect, however, a novelty is imported into the picture. Under
the doctrines of American law, at least, holders of security interests
in the form of Pennsylvania leasing agreements, conditional sales, or
equipment trusts, do not lose their secured rights upon an adjudication
in bankruptcy of the borrower of the money. The security holder,
because he holds title to the chattel, will be able to repossess the
45 The International Chamber of Commerce Subcommittee has recommended
the insertion of a provision which would limit recovery on a fleet mortgage to twothirds of two-thirds the value of the aircraft sold-which if adopted would utterly
destroy the value of the fleet mortgage.
40 Article VI-Sale in execution of an aircraft in conformity with the provisions of Article V shall effect the transfer of the property in such aircraft free
from all charges which are not assumed by the purchaser.
47 Van Huffel v. Harkelrode, 284 U.S. 225 (1931). In re Beardsley, 38 F.
Supp. 799 (D.C. D.Md. 1941).
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chattel in accordance with the usual commercial law prevailing in
his state. 48 Furthermore, it is a general rule that the property belonging to one person cannot be sold in execution for the debt of another.
The approach which the Brussels Committee took in drafting both
Articles V and VI was to treat all security interests as such, rather
than to segregate them into separate blocks of lien and ownership
interests. Consequently, under Article V (5), discussed above,
neither rights of property held as security, mortgages, leasehold interests; nor irrevocable options to purchase may be set up against
certain negligence claimants to a greater extent than 80 per cent of
the value of the aircraft unless adequate insurance is carried. It is
probable that Article VI will be construed in the same way and that
where an aircraft, which is subject to an equipment trust and consequently owned by a bank, is seized, in execution of a debt owed by
the airline, it would be subject to sale free of the bank's interest.
In other words, the effects of Article VI cannot be avoided by the
choice of a title instead of a lien-type security.
Article VII- Transfer of Aircraft from One Nationality to Another
In Article VII,49 transfer of registration from the nationality
register of one country to that of another creates a great many problems as to how security interests recorded in the country of transfer
are to be handled. Under the preceding drafts, elaborate machinery
was set forth as to the maintenance of a record and the procedure
to be followed when the aircraft is transferred from one nationality
register to another. At Montreal, during the meetings of the Fourth
Commission in May of '1947, the British delegate suggested that
the elaborate provisions theretofore contained in the various drafts
be. eliminated. In their stead, he suggested a simple article, much
along the lines of present Article VII. This would impose the obligation on the authorities of the state from which the aircraft is to
be transferred to see to it that the consent of all holders of recorded
rights had been obtained or their claims satisfied before the aircraft
could be deregistered. Since under Article 18 of the International
Convention on Civil Aviation signed at Chicago in December of
1944, an aircraft cannot be validly registered in more than onestate, the prohibition set forth in Article VII would effectively prevent registration in a new country until the recorded rights have been
satisfied or consent obtained from the holders. The. method proposed
offers several advantages from the administrative point of view,
since the administrative authorities can insist that the prospective
transferee furnish complete proofs that the required conditions for
transfer have been met. Once this has been done, the aircraft may
be deregistered from the nationality register of the transferring country
and will be free to be registered on the nationality register of another
48

In re Lakes Laundry, Inc., 79 F(2d) 326 (C.C.A. 2nd, 1935).
Article VII-No transfer of an aircraft from the nationality register or
the record of a Contracting State to that of another State shall be made, unless
all holders of recorded rights have been satisfied or consent to the transfer.
49
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state. To what extent this proposal may require revision of the
Civil Aeronautics Act to take care of ownership of a U.S. registered
aircraft by a non-citizen is outside the scope of this article.
The suggestion has been made that the approach of the Legal
Committee in the Brussels draft be reversed. 50 That is, instead
of placing responsibility on the administrative authorities at the time
of deregistration, such responsibility would be placed on them before
permitting the aircraft to be registered. It is believed that this
approach would have several unfortunate effects. The procedures
necessary to determine that all claims have either been satisfied or
that the holders thereof have consented to the transfer would be
administratively impossible for aeronautical authorities located in a
different country frequently thousands of miles away from where
the claims arose. Moreover, it would mean that where an aircraft
is to be transferred from the nationality register of a Contracting
State to the nationality register of a non-Contracting State valid liens
in the Contracting State would not necessarily be protected. On
the other hand, the proposal would afford protection to liens created
in a non-Contracting State upon transfer to the record of a Contracting State, thereby securing to lien holders of such non-Contracting
State a certain measure of protection to which they are not entitled
until their country has ratified the Convention. For these reasons,
it is believed that this suggestion is not a practical one.
Article VIII- Spare Parts
Article VIII

a

is the solution of a problem which is quite different

50Comments submitted by International Chamber of Commerce, ICAO
Doe. 5054.
51 Article VIII- (1) If, in conformity with the law of a Contracting State
where an aircraft is registered, a recorded right of the nature specified in
Article I, and held as security for the payment of an indebtedness, extends to
spare parts stored in a specified place or places, such right shall be recognized
by all Contracting States, as long as the spare parts remain in the place or
places specified, provided that an appropriate public notice, specifying the description of the right, the name and address of the holder of this right and the
record in which such right is recorded, is exhibited at such place where such
spare parts are located, so as to give due notification to third parties that such
spare parts are encumbered.
(2) A statement indicating the character and the approximate number of
such spare parts shall be annexed or included to the recorded document. Such
parts may be replaced by similar parts without affecting the right of the creditor.
(3) The provisions of Article V (1) and (4) and of Article VI shall apply
to a judicial sale of spare parts. However, in fixing the minimum bid at which
the sale can take place, account shall be taken of charges having priority over
the claim of the executing creditor only to the extent of two-thirds of the value
of the spare parts as determined by experts appointed by the authority responsible for the sale. Further, in the distribution of the proceeds of sale, the
competent authority may, in order to provide for the claim of the executing
creditor, limit the amount payable to holders of such priority charges to twothirds of the amount of such proceeds of sale after payment of costs referred to
in Article V (6).
(4) For the purpose of this Article the term "spare parts" means parts of
aircraft, engines, propellers, radio apparatus, instruments, appliances, furnishings, parts of any of the foregoing, and generally any other articles of whatever
description maintained for installation in aircraft in substitution for parts or
articles removed.
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from the one we have been considering heretofore. The earlier
Articles of the Convention deal with the recognition in Contracting
States of rights validly created in foreign aircraft of other Contracting
States. In Art icle VIII the undertaking is to protect rights in spare
parts which are to be stored and maintained by foreign airlines within
domestic territory.
In the case of an airplane, the question is merely one of recognizing a foreign-held right in a chattel which is only temporarily
within the jurisdiction. On the other hand, a stock-pile of spare
parts owned by the foreign airline may remain in the jurisdiction
over extended periods of time.
In view of this difference and the fact that the spare parts will in
reality receive their entire protection from the local law of the country
in which they are stored, many of the delegates,were reluctant to
agree to treating them differently from other chattels permanently
located in the domestic territory. However, there are in fact certain
characteristics which distinguish such spare parts from other chattels
which belong to domestic citizens. Under Article 24 (b) of the Chicago Convention, spare parts are to be admitted free of customs duty
by the Contracting States, although provision is made for keeping
such spare parts under customs control and supervision if so desired
by the state in whose territory they are located. Moreover, where
spare parts are patented articles, they will also receive the limited
protection of Article 27 of the Chicago Convention, which limits the
attachment of such spare parts in connection with patent suits and
other patent claims.
The necessity for some protection of spare parts located abroad is
almost vital if adequate financing is to be obtained. Frequently,
the cost of spare parts will amount to more than 25% of the total
financial needs of the carrier. From the standpoint of efficiency of
operation a large proportion must be kept in stock piles abroad, available for ready use at different points along the interiational line. If
such spare parts must be kept at home because of inability to give
effective liens on them abroad, air transportation will ,be slowed down
and may be rendered less safe. Moreover, irrespective of efficiency
of operations, a certain minimum quantity of spares must be maintained along the route, and in some cases failure to obtain financing
for such spares has resulted in the falling through of an entire financing arrangement for a new fleet. Consequently, all the delegates felt
that there was a substantial need for some kind of spare parts protection. Article VIII is the solution which they developed. By paragraph (1) the Contracting States undertake to recognize secured
rights in spare parts, provided that a local notice is posted at the
place where they are kept advising persons dealing with the airline
that the spare parts are subject to lien. In certain respects it is similar
to the "warehousing" principle frequently employed in this country.
In addition to the local notices which must be posted at all places
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where spare parts are kept, a statement indicating the character and
approximate number of such spare parts must be annexed to (or included in) the recorded document in the record of the state whose
nationality the aircraft bears. Stich statement is not intended to
indicate that a detailed inventory of the spare parts must be furnished
but merely their general description and approximate number.
Obviously, the provision would be of little value unless a "floating
charge" on the spare parts were permitted. This is expressly allowed
by paragraph (2) of the Artcle, which states that the parts may be
replaced by similar parts without affecting the right of the creditor.
In this manner, the airline may freely interchange spare parts located
at different depots without in any way impairing the lien of the
secured creditor.
The American delegation argued that there should be no apportionment of the lien of the mortgage with respect to the spare parts,
but that if the mortgage indenture so provided the entire amount of
the mortgage debt should be jointly secured by all spare parts located
in the several depots. The argument was made that the spare parts
themselves could in no way injure local inhabitants, and that negligence claims could not arise from the storage of such parts in domestic
territory. This argument was rejected, and an apportionment provision inserted which provides for the appraisal of the spare parts by
experts appointed by the court, and permits the minimum bid at
which they may be sold at two-thirds of such appraisal. Thereafter,
the secured creditor may be limited to two-thirds of the proceeds of
the sale. Although this provision does not offer the complete security
which might be desirable from the point of view of financial interests.
it is believed that adequate protection is afforded, and a secured creditor enabled to lend substantial amounts against spare parts lotated
abroad.
The term spare parts has been broadly defined so as to include
articles of every nature and description which are maintained abroad
for installation in aircraft in substitution of articles removed. Obviously, the definition would not include tools, machinery, or other
objects used on the ground and not intended for installation in an
aircraft.
Since Article XIII injects into our law a wholly new principle,
it is believed that new legislation will have to be enacted both for
the purpose of fulfilling our obligations under the Convention with
respect to spare parts of foreign airlines located in United States territory and for the purpose of obtaining protection for U.S. owned spare
parts located abroad. The latter objective can be met, it is submitted merely by a declaration of policy that the procedure detailed
by paragraph (1) is in conformity with the UTnited States law, and
that rights in U.S. registered aircraft may be extended to cover spare
parts -located abroad.
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Article IX-Applicability of Convention
This article 52 has been discussed to a large extent in connection
with the discussion of Article III (6). The intent of the two articles
in combination is to provide that the-Convention shall be observed and
shall apply to all foreign aircraft registered in Contracting States
when on the domestic territory of any given Contracting State, and
to domestic aircraft to the extent of Article VII (the transfer of one
aircraft from one registry to another) and Article III with respect
to priority claims which are incurred by the aircraft while abroad.
As pointed out in the discussion under Article III the Contracting
State may provide in its own law that priority claims arising domestically shall also apply to such aircraft and be regarded as priority
claims when the aircraft travels abroad. Some criticism has been
received on the drafting of this particular Article, and it may well
be that it cin be rephrased in a happier manner., No one, however,
has suggested a change in substance of the Article, and so long as
this is true probably a better solution can be reached when the
draft is finalized at the Second Assembly at Geneva.
Article X-Laws Relating to Immigration, Smuggling, etc.
This Article 53 would undoubtedly represent the law of all Contracting States in any event. However, in order to make it amply clear
that the ,Convention would not over-ride true police regulations of
the Contracting States, the Article has been inserted. Article X14
deals with miltary and police aircraft and needs no comment.
Article XIV-Definitions
It will be noted from this definition 5 that the engines, propellers,
radio apparatus and other articles intended for use in the aircraft
even though temporarily separated therefrom are included in the
term "aircraft." This should not, however, conflict with the definition of spare parts in Article 8. It is interesting to note that this
definition may be at variance with the definition of aircraft in the
Civil Aeronautics Act, which is open to the construction of applying
only to the airframe and not including engines, propellers, or other
accessories used in airplanes. Depending on the type of mortgage or
secured interests in these various articles, this provision may have
the effect of changing lien rights when the airplane goes abroad. For
52 Article IX-This Convention applies to aircraft registered as to nationality in a Contracting State, provided that a Contracting State shall not be
obliged to apply this Convention (except Articles III and VII) within its own
territory to aircraft there registered.
5 Article X-Nothing in this Convention shall prejudice the right of any
Contracting State to enforce against an aircraft its national laws relating to
immigration, smuggling or air navigation.
54 Article XI-This Convention shall not apply to aircraft used in military, customs or police services.
55 Article XIV-For the purposes of this Convention the terms "aircraft"
shall include the air frame, engines, propellers, radio apparatus, and all other
articles intended for use in the aircraft whether installed therein or temporarily
separated therefrom.
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example, if a secured creditor has a chattel mortgage on an engine
which is attached to an aircraft which in turn is mortgaged to another
party, the chattel mortgage of the engine would be merged in the
superior lien of the aircraft chattel mortgagee when the aircraft goes
abroad.
Formal Articles
The remaining articles in the Convention are for the main part
formal articles which are of no particular pertinency to this discussion.
However, it is interesting to note that the Convention will come into
effect as soon as any two signatories have ratified it.
CONCLUSION

It is believed that the Convention, when ratified, and in force
among a substantial number of countries, will go a long way toward
clarifying the situation with respect to the international recognition
of rights in aircraft, and will afford a substantial measure of protection to secured creditors of aircraft traveling abroad. It should be
recognized, of course, that the Convention does not guarantee complete security to such creditors. However, as a compromise of conflicting points of view, policies, and internal laws, it is believed that
this draft is the most satisfactory that can possibly be obtained. There
are certain parts of the Convention which undoubtedly are not too
clear and some aspects of the problem have not been covered. But
no matter how much time is spent on an international problem as
complicated as this one, it would be impossible to arrive at a perfect
solution, satisfactory to everybody. Therefore, it is believed that the
points of uncertainty should be left to the courts and subsequent
amendment to the Convention if that is shown to be necessary.
Despite its weak spots, the Convention should provide a wide measure
of protection, particularly where adequate attention is paid to the
conflicts problems when the financing arrangements are being formulated.

